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CRISIS CARTELS AND THE TRIUMPH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY OVER
COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE
Andre Fiebig*
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of European competition law as codified in
the Treaty Establishing the European Community' is primari-
ly the responsibility of the European Commission, which has
traditionally been accorded much discretion by the European
courts. Although the Commission is the "Guardian of the Trea-
ty," it is comprised of 20 Commissioners appointed by the
Member States.2 It is therefore inevitable that they each are
exposed to political influences which are not necessarily coinci-
dental with the objectives of the EC Treaty. The exposure to
political influences combined with the responsibility of apply-
ing the competition law inevitably creates some tension. This
tension is particularly evident in the relationship between
industrial policy and competition law. The Commission's posi-
tion on crisis cartels is one instance where industrial policy
has triumphed over competition law. Although crisis cartels, as
horizontal collusion to limit production, represent the most
reprehensible types of anti-competitive practices, the Commis-
sion has been willing to bend the prohibition on cartels to
I Attorney, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago; Adjunct Professor, North-
western University School of Law, Chicago.
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COIMIMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY], incorporating
changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU], and amended by Treaty of
Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Br.
Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), as amended by Single European Act, O.J. (L 169)
1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741. The Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the com-
plete renumbering of the EC Treaty in accordance with the table of equivalences
referred to in Article 12 of the treaty and contained in the treaty's Annex. This
renumbering took effect on May 1, 1999. All references to the EC Treaty are to
the renumbered version.
2. For an insightful discussion of the structure of the Commission and its
role in competition policy, see MICHELLE CINI & LEE MCGOWAN, COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 41-53 (1998).
BROOK. J. INTL L.
support European industry under certain circumstances. This
not only distorts the application of the competition rules, it
imposes a serious social cost on Europeans.
I. THE MEANING OF THE TERM "CRISIS CARTEL"
Neither the European Commission nor the European
Court of Justice has expressly adopted a definition of the term
"crisis cartel." Based on the Commission's practice in applying
the European competition laws, the term "crisis cartel" can be
defined as agreements between most or all competitors in a
particular market to systematically restrict output and/or re-
duce capacity in response to a crisis in that particular indus-
try.3 There are three components to the definition. First, there
must be an agreement between most or all of the competitors
in a specific market. Although a cartel can be comprised of two
or more members, the Commission applies the crisis cartel
label only to horizontal agreements to reduce capacity which
include most of the competitors in the particular sector.'
Agreements between onlya few of the firms in a specific indus-
try to reduce excess capacity are referred to as joint structural
capacity reductions.' Second, the objective of the cartel must
be to systematically restrict output and/or reduce capacity.' As
discussed below, the Commission requires that as a condition
to its approval the participants in the crisis cartel adopt a plan
to systematically reduce capacity! Finally, the cartel must be
3. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 23RD REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 1993 47, para. 82 (1994) [hereinafter 23RD REPORT].
4. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 12TH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 1982 43, para. 39 (1983) [hereinafter 12TH REPORT].
5. See CODMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 13TH REPORT ON COM-
PETITION POLICY 1984 55, para. 61 (1984) [hereinafter 13TH REPORT]. There are
two types of joint structural capacity reductions. The first of these falls under the
heading "reciprocal specialization." 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 49, para. 86. In
the early 1980s, for example, two British petrochemical companies, Imperial Chem-
icals Industries (ICI) and British Petroleum (BP) entered into an agreement where-
by BP specialized in low density polyethylene and ICI in polyvinylchloride. The
Commission permitted the agreement because "the closures of the older plants
reduced capacity in sectors that were suffering from structural overcapacity." COM-
MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 14TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
1984 71, para. 84 (1985). See BPCL/ICI, 1984 O.J. (L 212) 1. See also
ENI/Montedison, 1987 O.J. (L 5) 13; COMMISsION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
17TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1987 70, para. 74 (1988).
6. See 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 48, para. 84; 12TH REPORT, supra note
4, at 43, para. 39.
7. See 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 48, para. 85; 12TH REPORT, supra note
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in response to a crisis in the relevant industry.' The term "cri-
sis" in this context refers to a situation of prolonged structural
excess capacity in a particular industry causing many or most
of the incumbent firms to operate at a loss.'
The difficulty in defining crisis cartels in the context of
European competition law is that the Commission uses a defi-
nition of excess capacity that is broader than the definition
generally used in economic theory. The Commission applies the
term "excess capacity" to the difference between the industry's
maximum possible output using existing facilities and the
actual output of that industry.10 In contrast, an economist
would say that an industry is experiencing excess capacity
when the incumbent firms are producing at an output level
which is below that at which average costs are at a mini-
mum." Under this definition an industry may be producing at
full capacity even though it has not achieved maximum possi-
ble output. This occurs when the firm is producing at the low-
est level of its average total costs curve and this level is less
than maximum output. For example, where a firm is producing
100 widgets at a cost of $10 each, but the lowest point on its
average cost curve is 150 widgets at a cost of $7 each, there is
excess capacity of 50 widgets.
In addition, the excess capacity must be structural. 2 Ac-
cording to the Commission, structural excess capacity exists,
where over a prolonged period all of the undertakings con-
cerned have been experiencing a significant reduction in their
4, at 43, para. 39.
8. Based on the requirements established by the Commission, a crisis cartel
is not permissible in service industries. For example, the Commission has taken
the position in response to overcapacity in the air transport sector that it will
"never" accept cartels aimed at reducing capacity. See Comments of Competition
Commissar Van Miert, reported in Ministers Discuss the Crisis-No Cartel Will be
Authorized, Either to Reduce Capacities or to Set Prices, Says Mr. Van Miert,
AGENCE EUROPE, 27/28, 1993 at 5. See also David Gardner, No Backtracking on
'Open Skies' policy, says Brussels, FIN. TIIES, Sept. 28, 1993, at 20.
9. See 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 48, para. 84; 12TH REPORT, supra note
4, at 43, para. 38. The terms "overcapacity" and "surplus capacity" are sometimes
used synonymously with 'excess capacity."
10. 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 48, para. 84; 12TH REPORT, supra note 4,
at 43, para. 38.
11. See, e.g., G.S. MADDALA & ELLEN MILLER, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND
APPLIcATIONS 204 (1989).
12. See 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 47, para. 82; 12TH REPORT, supra note
4, at 43, para. 39.
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rates of capacity utilization, a drop in output accompanied by
substantial operating losses and where the information avail-
able does not indicate that any lasting improvement can be
expected in this situation in the medium-term.13
Unfortunately, the Commission has not specified the minimum
amount of time excess capacity must exist in order to be con-
sidered as structural. In the context of one crisis cartel permit-
ted by the Commission, the excess capacity which justified the
crisis cartel had plagued the industry for over ten years.14 In
a more recent case, however, the excess capacity existed only
for about a year prior to the time the Commission's exemption
came into force. 5
III. CAUSES OF EXCESS CAPACITY
A. Business Cycles
Since the existence of excess capacity is the justification
for crisis cartels, it is important to identify its various causes.
Excess capacity has been explained by reference to business
cycles. 6 Demand in many industries-particularly commodity
industries-is cyclical. 7 Since supply does not immediately
follow oscillations of demand, an unexpected fall in demand for
a particular product will, at least in the short-term, create a
situation where the capacity of the industry to supply a partic-
ular product exceeds the actual demand for that product.
An actual fall in demand is, however, not necessary to
create excess capacity. Excess capacity may also be created in
an industry which is susceptible to business cycles because of
an incorrect estimation of the development of demand. A
manager's decision to expand capacity is determined by her
assessment of the future development of demand for a particu-
13. 12TH REPORT, supra note 4, at 43, para. 38. See also Community Guide-
lines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty, 1994 O.J.
(C 368) 12, 16.
14. See Commission Decision 84/380, 1984 O.J. (L 207) 17, 18 [hereinafter
Synthetic Fibres].
15. See Commission Decision 94/296, 1994 O.J. (L 131) 15, 17 [hereinafter
Stichting Baksteen].
16. See MOSES ABRAMOVITZ, INVENTORIES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 11 (1950).
17. See generally Susanto Basu & Alan Taylor, Business Cycles in Internation-
al Historical Perspective, 13 J. EcON. PERSP. 45 (1999).
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lar product. 8 The challenge facing the manager tends to be
greater in those industries in which fixed costs are high and
the creation of additional capacity time-consuming." In the
semiconductor industry, for example, a new chip factory re-
quires a capital investment of approximately $2 billion and two
years' time." There is an incentive- to create excess capacity
because a firm which correctly anticipates a significant in-
crease in demand for a particular product or service will gener-
ally realize greater profit than a firm which waits until de-
mand increases until it decides to expand its capacity. Con-
versely, an incorrect anticipation of the direction of demand
can result in excess capacity.
The incentive to expand capacity without waiting for an
increase in demand is accentuated by the uncertainty and
implications of losing market share. In industries characterized
by high fixed costs and relatively low product differentiation,
managers generally tend to favor expanding or at least main-
taining capacity even if it results in excess capacity.2' In such
industries, managers fear reducing capacity because it would
hinder their ability to respond promptly to an ensuing rise in
demand.
B. Strategic Behavior of Incumbent Firms
Excess capacity may also be the result of strategic behav-
ior of incumbent firms to deter potential market entrants. A
potential entrant's decision to enter a particular market is
primarily influenced by the perceived profit to be made from
that entry relative to the costs of entry. One important factor
in determining whether sufficient profit could be achieved
18. See MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 325-28 (1980) (identifying the factors which manag-
ers should use to determine whether to expand capacity).
19. Certain industries are characterized by high fixed costs. When the demand
for the goods produced by these industries drops, firms may be able to relatively
quickly reduce their variable costs. However, fixed costs are not only expensive to
dismantle, they are expensive to restart once demand returns. Moreover, there is
an incentive not to reduce fixed costs since this will increase marginal costs.
20. See Paul Taylor, Brighter Prospects In View, FIN. TIMES, IT Supplement,
Mar. 3, 1999, at IV.
21. See id. ([Overcapacity in the semiconductor market] is made worse by
companies' fear of losing market share. This encourages chipmakers to delay clos-
ing the surplus plant."); Timothy Aeppel, Why 'Too Much Stuff Means Little Now,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1997, at A2.
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upon entry is the level of excess capacity existing in the partic-
ular industry." The likelihood of market entry in a particular
industry operating at 90% capacity is much greater than mar-
ket entry into an industry operating at 60% capacity. Thus,
strategic increases in capacity by the incumbent firms may
serve to deter market entry. Assuming that demand does *not
correspondingly increase, this strategic behavior will result in
excess capacity.'
Increases in capacity may also be the result of strategic
efforts of the incumbent firms to force an existing market par-
ticipant from the market.24 This is possible-particularly in
commodity industries-because an increase in capacity unre-
lated to a corresponding increase in demand will generally
have the effect of lowering the price for a particular product in
a given market. If the competitors force the price below a level
at which other firms in the market cannot maintain a suffi-
cient profit to at least cover their costs, these other firms will
be forced from the market. This is generally true for smaller
competitors or competitors not belonging to corporate groups
which are able to cross-subsidize their loss-making activities
until the price for the particular good or service increases. An
example of strategic behavior resulting in the creation of ex-
cess capacity can be found in the European airline industry.
Most if not all of the Member States are dominated by one
major airline which is able to absorb losses due to sustained
periods of excess capacity.' One way in which they have pro-
tected their position when faced with competition from a small-
er rival has been to drive prices below a sufficiently profitable
level by maintaining or increasing excess capacity.26
22. See PORTER, supra note 18, at 325-28.
23. The theory of ex ante increases in capacity as a strategy of entry deter-
rence was first formalized by A. Michael Spence, Entry, Investment and
Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534 (1977), and subsequently expanded upon
by a number of authors, most notably B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, The
Theory of Market Pre-emption: The Persistence of Excess Capacity and Monopoly in
Growing Spatial Markets, 46 ECONOMICA 149 (1979), and Avinash Dixit, The Role
of Investment in Entry Deterrence, 90 ECON. J. 95 (1980).
24. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
373-78 (1987).
25. See Mark A. Johnson, Removing Barriers to Market Entry in the Air
Transport Industry: The Application of EC Competition Rules, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF
EUR. INTEGRATION 1, 27 (1993).




Traditional economic models assume that entrepreneurs
are rational actors. Based on this assumption, one would ex-
pect that capacity would fluctuate relative to demand. How-
ever, there are several psychological factors which may be used
to explain how excess capacity is created. First, isomorphic
behavior may contribute to excess capacity. Because the devel-
opment of demand can never be predicted with complete accu-
racy, there is uncertainty associated with the decision to ex-
pand capacity. The longer it takes to build new capacity, the
greater the uncertainty. Managers and entrepreneurs, as well
as humans in general, when faced with uncertainty tend to
adopt the behavior of other individuals similarly situated.
When faced with the necessity to adopt a particular strategy or
policy, a business manager will tend to give special credence to
similar strategies adopted by other companies. 7 This "herd
behavior" has the potential of creating excess capacity.2"
In addition, overly optimistic forecasting may result in
excess capacity. Empirical studies have shown that entrepre-
neurs tend to be overconfident about their abilities and overly
optimistic about the future." Entrepreneurs may enter a new
market or expand production based on unrealistic expectations
of their future rather than realistic expectations of the develop-
ment of demand. This has the potential of increasing capacity
in a particular industry in excess of demand."°
Chris Adams, Two Steelmakers May Build New Mills, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1998,
at A2.
27. See P.J. DiMaggio & W.W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV.
147 (1983); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Invest-
ment, 80 Aii. ECON. REV. 465 (1990).
28. See Aeppel, supra note 21, at A2 (explaining the "psychology of overcapac-
ity]").
29. See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999); James March & Zur
Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404
(1987).
30. See Joan Robinson, The Impossibility of Competition, in MONOPOLY AND
COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION 245, 253-54 (Edward Chamberlin ed., 1954).
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D. State Intervention
Excess capacity may also exist because of exogenous mar-
ket distortions. The state may create excess capacity when it
interferes with market forces, for example, through subsidies
to inefficient firms. When a firm receives a subsidy, it is pro-
tected to a certain degree from the market mechanism which
would otherwise force it to reduce its capacity to a level where
it could achieve a profit. For example, one of the main causes
of excess capacity in the Community's synthetic fibers industry
in the late 1970's which eventually led to the creation of a
crisis cartel was the fact that several of the major producers
were state-owned companies receiving substantial subsidies.31
This same scenario is evident in the European air travel sec-
tor32 and the automobile industry.33 The protection accorded
by state subsidies frustrates the ability of the market to
achieve equilibrium and results in excess capacity.
IV. POLICY OPTIONS
A. Market Forces
Excess capacity depresses prices and generally has a nega-
tive impact on the profits of the firms. When faced with declin-
ing profits due to prolonged excess capacity, firms tend to put
pressure on politicians for a response. Perhaps the most obvi-
ous policy option is for the government to allow the market
forces to address the problem. By driving prices below total
average costs, excess capacity forces the incumbent firms to
incur losses. This will persist until demand or efficiency in-
creases or capacity decreases. In the absence of government
intervention or private restraints of competition, capacity will
31. See Ren6 Joliet, Cartelisation, Dirigism and Crisis in the European Com-
munity, 3 WORLD ECON. 403, 412 (1981). The Commission eventually had to step
in and request the Member States not to grant assistance to firms in this indus-
try which would contribute to an increase in existing production capacity. COMMIs-
SION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 8TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 49,
para. 42 (1979) [hereinafter 8TH REPORT].
32. See Airlines Warn of Overcapacity, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at 2.
33. See Brandon Mitchener, Europe Looks Askance at Auto Subsidies As
Overproduction Looms As Problem, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at A18. The same
effect is also apparent in the United States. See Scott Kilman, Farmers to Plant
Record Soybean Acres Despite Price Drop, as Result of Subsidy, WALL ST. J., Apr.
1, 1999, at A2.
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generally decrease because the less efficient firms, i.e., those
with high average cost curves, will be forced from the market
or the existing firms will unilaterally reduce their capacity.'
The European Commission has itself indicated that in a free-
market economy this is the most common way of dealing with
excess capacity resulting in substantial losses."5
B. State Intervention
Another possible policy response would be for the state to
intervene in the market and induce the firms to eliminate
some of the excess capacity. For example, in the event of a
situation of excess capacity in the coal or steel industries, Arti-
cle 58 of the Treaty of Paris allows the Commission to estab-
lish a system of production quotas to reduce supply and there-
by increase prices to a level at which the incumbent firms can
make a profit.3" The EC Treaty does not contain a similar pro-
vision and, since the Community institutions can only act
where they have the express authority to do so, there is some
question whether the Community would be in the position to
order capacity reductions.
Nonetheless, there are other means available for the state
to induce capacity reductions. For example, a state could pay
the firms to reduce capacity. Although this is a form of state
aid prohibited by Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty," the Coin-
34. For example, Kimberly-Clark Corp., one of the world's leading tissue pro-
ducers, unilaterally decided to reduce excess capacity because the excess capacity
in the industry was forcing prices below a level at which Kimberly-Clark could
realize a sufficient profit. See Robert Langreth, Kimberly-Clark's Sweeping Cut-
backs Should Ease Overcapacity, Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1997, at A3.
See also Paul J. Deveney, Samsung Joins Effort to End Glut In Chip Market,
WALL ST. J., June 9, 1998, at A12; Dean Takahashi, Cirrus to Reduce Chip Manu-
facturing By 70%, Lay off 400 to 500 Employees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at
B6; Dean Takahashi & Quentin Hardy, Motorola to Halt Building Virginia Plant,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1998, at B8; Haig Simonian, Ford Warns of Action to Cut
Capacity, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1997, at 17.
35. See 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 47, para. 82. See also Stichting
Baksteen, supra note 15, at 19, para. 20; Synthetic Fibres, supra note 14, at 22,
para. 30.
36. See, e.g., Commission Decision 2794180, establishing a system of steel pro-
duction quotas for undertakings in the iron and steel industry, 1980 O.J. (L 291)
1. See generally J. J. Heusdens & R. de Horn, Crisis Policy in the European Steel
Industry in the Light of the ECSC Treaty, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 31 (1980).
37. The concept of aid is difficult to define but is commonly understood as an
advantage granted or otherwise facilitated by the state. See Case 61/79,
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mission will allow such aid if it is part of a feasible, coherent
and far-reaching plan to restore the firms' long-term viability
and will lead to an irreversible capacity reduction.39 More-
over, the rules on state aid contained in the EC Treaty do not
apply to the Community institutions. Thus, this policy option
is available to the Commission.
Yet a third manner in which the state could intervene in
the market to address a situation of excess capacity is to re-
strict the flow of imports into the relevant geographic market.
The demand which was once satisfied by foreign imports will
then be shifted to domestic producers thereby increasing their
capacity utilization rates. This form of state intervention typi-
cally is in the form of the imposition of duties, quotas or even
bilateral agreements with foreign countries to restrict the flow
of goods.40 The restriction of imports as a solution to excess
capacity is a politically attractive option since it does not re-
quire the domestic industry to reduce capacity. Consumers
suffer the net welfare loss as a result of such restraints.4'
C. Cartels
A third possible approach to address a situation of excess
capacity would be for the state to allow firms to agree among
themselves to reduce capacity. Several firms may agree to
acquire another producer and then close that production facili-
ty,42 or the incumbent firms may agree on a mutual reduction
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit Italiana, 1980 E.C.R. 1205,
1228, para. 31. For further discussion, see LEIGH HANCHER ET AL., EC STATE AIDS
19-20 (1993); Conor Quigley, The Notion of a State Aid in the EEC, 13 EUR. L.
REv. 242 (1988).
38. Article 87(1) prohibits all forms of aid granted by a Member State or
through state resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition and has
an effect on trade between Member States. EC TREATY art. 87(1).
39. See Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring
Firms in Difficulty, 1999 O.J. (C 288) 2. See, e.g., Commission Decision 96/115 on
the aid granted by the Italian State to the company Enichem Agricolura SA, 1996
O.J. (L 28) 18; Commission Decision 92/321 concerning aid awarded by Spain to
Intelhorce SA, 1992 O.J. (L 176) 57; Commission Decision 90/70 concerning state
aid provided by France to certain primary processing steel undertakings, 1990 O.J.
(L 47) 28.
40. See, e.g., David Sanger, Russian Deal Limits Exports of Cheap Steel, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, at C5; Russia Agrees to Scale Back Steel Exports By Almost
70%, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Feb. 24, 1999, at 314.
41. See, e.g., Steven Berry et al., Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles:
Evaluating a Trade Policy, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 400 (1999).
42. See WERNER BENISCH, WEGE DES ABBAUS VON BRANCHENOBERKAPAZITATEN,
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in capacity based on a defined quota or formula. In both cases,
competition law plays an important role since the agreement
would essentially amount to a cartel. Thus, the cartel approach
is only a legitimate policy option if such cartels are permissible
under the applicable competition laws.
V. COMPETITION LAW APPLIED TO CRISIS CARTELS
A. Infringement of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty
Crisis cartels could fall under the prohibitions on anti-
competitive practices codified in Article 81 and Article 82 of
the EC Treaty.43 According to Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty,
"all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associa-
tions of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market" are prohibited." The application
of Article 81(1) depends on three requirements, each of which
is fulfilled in the case of crisis cartels. First, there must be an
agreement, a decision by issociations of undertakings, or con-
certed practice between undertakings. The concept of "agree-
ment" in the context of Article 81(1) encompasses not only
formal contracts but all situations where "the undertakings in
question have expressed their joint intention to conduct them-
selves on the market in a specific way." Thus, in cases of
crisis cartels there is generally no issue whether the first ele-
ment of an infringement of Article 81(1) is fulfilled.46 In fact,
even those undertakings which were not actually parties to the
agreement but "cooperated with it and knowingly associated
themselves with its overall objectives" will be considered part
of the cartel.47
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAIMTE HANDELSRECHT 197, 202-04 (1978).
43. EC TREATY arts. 81, 82.
44. Id. art. 81(1).
45. Case T-7/89, Hercules v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-1711, para. 256 (Ct.
First Instance).
46. See Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, at 18, para. 15; Commission Deci-
sion 891515 Welded Steel Mesh, 1989 O.J. (L 260) 1, 34, para. 158, affd Case T-
143/89, Ferriere Nord v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 11-917 (Ct. First Instance); Com-
mission Decision, 1989 O.J. (L 74) 21, 33, para. 40 [hereinafter LdPEI; Synthetic
Fibres, supra note 14, at 21, para. 25; Commission Decision 80/1334 Italian Cast
Glass, 1980 O.J. (L 383) 19, 23.
47. LdPE, supra note 46, at 33, para. 41.
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Second, there must be an effect on trade between Member
States.48 Given the broad interpretation of this requirement,
crisis cartels will have an effect on trade between Member
States because they typically involve the leading firms from
within the Member States of the Community.49 The fact that
the parties to the agreement may even be located in one Mem-
ber State does not indicate the absence of an effect on trade
between Member States. Even agreements limited to one Mem-
ber State can have an effect on trade between. Member
States."0 This applies in particular to crisis cartels which gen-
erally involve a large portion of the undertakings active in a
particular market.5 '
Finally, there must be an appreciable restraint of competi-
tion within the European Community. According to the
Commission, a restraint of competition occurs if the agreement
or concerted practice results in a price level for the product or
service which is above the price level which would be deter-
mined by conditions of free competition." One type of re-
straint that is expressly prohibited by Article 81(1) is an agree-
ment between firms to limit or control production.' Since cri-
sis cartels not only result in higher prices but also limit pro-
duction, they are, in the words of the Commission, "usually
caught by Article 85."'
48. See EC TREATY art. 81(1)
49. See Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren, 1972 O.J. (L 13) 34 (Cartel which
was limited to the Netherlands nonetheless had an effect on trade between Mem-
ber States).
50. See id. See also Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, (all members of crisis
cartel were in the Netherlands).
51. See Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, at 19, para. 17; Synthetic Fibres,
supra note 14, at 22, para, 27.
52. See Case 5/69, Vdlk v. Vervaecke, 1969 E.C.R. 295; Case 56/65, Socidt6
Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Uln, 1966 E.C.R. 235.
53. See Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel, 1999 O.J. (L 24) 1, at 54, para. 146.
54. EC TREATY art. 81(1)(b).
55. In the amended EC TREATY the language of Article 85 is found in Article
81. 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 48, para. 83. See, e.g., Stichting Baksteen,
supra note 15, at 18, para. 15; LdPE, supra note 46, at 33, para. 42; Synthetic
Fibres, supra note 14, at 22, para. 26; Rolled Zinc Products and Zinc Alloys, 1982
O.J. (L 362) 40, at 48; Italian Cast Glass, supra note 46, at 23. See also Case T-




B. Exemption of Crisis Cartels
Since agreements that infringe Article 81(1) are automati-
cally invalid and the participating firms are subject to fines,56
the question arises whether crisis cartels can be exempted
under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. This provision allows the
Commission to exempt an agreement which infringes Article
81(1) if four conditions are fulfilled: (1) the agreement must
"contribute[ ] to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,"5" (2)
consumers must obtain "a fair share of the resulting bene-
fit,"" (3) the restrictions imposed must be indispensable to
the attainment of the beneficial results,59 and (4) the parties
to the agreement must not be afforded "the possibility of elimi-
nating competition in respect of a substantial part of the prod-
ucts in question.6
1. Development of Policy
Since crisis cartels clearly infringe Article 81(1) of the EC
Treaty, the fundamental policy issue is whether these types of
restrictive agreements should be exempted under Article 81(3)
of the EC Treaty. Since, as is discussed below, crisis cartels do
not technically meet the four requirements of Article 81(3),61
the Commission's policy decision to permit such arrangements
has distorted the legal interpretation of Article 81(3). Like so
many other areas in European law, crisis cartels illustrate how
the law is shaped to fit the policy.
In the early 1970's, the Commission was first faced with
the decision whether to exempt a crisis cartel under Article
81(3)." A group of Dutch cement producers had entered into
an agreement providing for the allocation of quotas for the
Netherlands along with uniform pricing and sales terms."
After the Commission objected to the price control arrange-
56. See EC TREATY art. 83(2)(a).
57. Id. art. 81(3).
58. Id.
59. See id. art. 81(3)(a).
60. Id. art. 81(3)(b).
61. See discussion, infra Part V.B.2.
62. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMIUNITIES, SECOND REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 1973 37, para. 29 (1973) [hereinafter 2ND REPORT].
63. See id.
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ments which the cartel had established,' the group applied
for an exemption..' The cement producers argued that the
industry was in a crisis situation characterized by excess ca-
pacity.66 The Commission refused to promulgate general rules
for exempting crisis cartels but instead stated that it would
take a case-by-case analysis:
At the competition policy level it is necessary to know
under what conditions these difficulties can be resolved by an
agreement between undertakings in a manner compatible
with the Treaty's competition rules. This problem is too deli-
cate to afford grounds for hoping that it can be solved by a
general approach. The method of case-by-case examination is
unavoidable.'
The Commission's review in that case revealed that the
measures adopted by the cartel participants were not neces-
sary to address the problem.6" In 1978, however, the Commis-
sion actually took an active role in promoting a crisis cartel in
the synthetic fibers industry. Faced with prolonged excess
capacity in that industry, Viscount Etienne Davignon, who was
the Commissioner for Industrial Policy at the time, encouraged
the synthetic fibers producers in the Community to cooperate
to reduce capacity.69 This industrial policy decision did not sit
well with those within the Commission charged with protecting
competition. 0 The Commission was faced with the fundamen-
tal question of whether a crisis cartel could be exempted under
-Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. The basic problem would be to
reconcile the industrial policy with the application of the com-
petition laws. The Commission's Directorate General for Com-
petition initially took the position that the agreement could not
be exempted because all of the major European producers were
64. See Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren, supra note 49.
65. See Commission Decision 72(468, 1972 O.J. (L 303) 7.
66. See 2ND REPORT, supra note 62, at 37, para. 29.
67. Id. at 26, para. 18.
68. See Commission Decision 72/468, supra note 65, at 7; 2ND REPORT, supra
note 62, at 41, para. 31.
69. For a discussion of the events surrounding the formation of this cartel, see
Joliet, supra note 31, at 412-15; R.B. BOUTERSE, COMPETITION AND INTEGRATION,
WHAT GOALS CoUNT? 60-66 (1994); Thomas Sharpe, The Commission's Proposals on
Crisis Cartels, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 75, 77-80 (1980).
70. See Joliet, supra note 31, at 413.
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involved.7 ' As indicated above, in order to qualify for an ex-
emption, the agreement cannot afford the possibility of elimi-
nating competition in respect of a substantial part of the prod-
ucts in question.
Since the Commission does not have the authority to au-
thorize practices that are contrary to the EC Treaty,7 2 the
permissibility of crisis cartels requires special legislation. In
July 1978, Viscount Davignon met with Raymond Vouel who
was then serving as Commissioner for Competition Policy.73
They agreed to introduce a proposal for drafting a regulation
based on Article 83 of the EC Treaty74 to be submitted to the
Council by the Commission which would exempt the crisis
cartel. However, these two Commissioners were unable to
garner sufficient support from their colleagues within the Com-
mission, and the proposal was abandoned in July of that
year.75 The strict application of the competition laws still held
sway over industrial policy. According to the Commission, its
policy "regularly confirmed by the Court of Justice, is that it is
not permissible for undertakings to use restrictive agreements
or concerted practices to determine the way in which their
output or their sales will progress."76
One year later, the Commission took the same strict ap-
proach in response to a cartel of cast glass producers. 7 The
firms, representing approximately 75% of the Italian cast glass
market, had entered into an agreement involving production
quotas.7" They argued that the cartel was entered into in re-
71. See id.
72. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Associa-
tion v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5078, para. 136.
73. See id. at 413, 439 n.58.
74. According to Article 83, the Council is authorized to adopt regulations or
directives to give effect to Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The general con-
sensus is that it is unlikely that, if challenged, this provision would have allowed
the Council to preempt the application of the competition laws to crisis cartels.
See Joliet, supra note 31, at 420; Ulrich Immenga, Internationale
Selbstbeschrdnkungsabkommen zwischen staatlicher Handelspolitik und privater
Wettbewerbsbeschriinkung, 49 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT rtjR AUSLMADISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 303, 323 (1985); Gabriela Wallenberg, Das
Krisenkartell europcischer Chemiefaserhersteller, 1986 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFT 755; Sharpe, supra note 69, at 80.
75. See Joliet, supra note 31, at 414.
76. 8TH REPORT, supra note 31, at 50, para. 42.
77. See Italian Cast Glass, supra note 46.
78. See id.
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sponse to a structural crisis and therefore should have been
exempted under Article 81(3) as a permissible crisis cartel.
Since the cartel was not notified to the Commission, the issu-
ance of an exemption under Article 81(3) was precluded."
However, the Commission stated that even if the crisis cartel
would have been notified, no exemption would have been
granted: "At all events, at least one of the requirements under
Article 85(3) has not been met, since, through the agreements
which are the subject of this decisions, more than half of Ital-
ian production of cast glass was shielded from competition,
thus eliminating competition in respect of a substantial
part." ° In response to the arguments that the crisis situation
justified the creation of the cartel, the Commissiori stated quite
directly that Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty "makes no refer-
ence to such a situation."8 The position held by the Commis-
sion up to the beginning of the 1980's was therefore consistent
with the opinion of the competition law scholars.8 2
Within two years, however, economic developments caused
the Commission to change its position dramatically. The first
formal indication that the Commission was ready to exempt a
crisis cartel appeared in its Twelfth Report on Competition
Policy:
As the economic recession persists, problems of overcapacity
are appearing in increasingly acute form in individual firms
and entire industries. The associated employment problems
are particularly worrying at a time of high unemployment in
all the Member States. In such circumstances, the Commis-
sion must offer guidance as to how far it considers the solu-
tions sought by firms as compatible with Article 85 of the
EEC Treaty.83
Although the Commission had earlier suggested that a
crisis cartel may be exempted under Article 81(3), the situation
was now ripe for relying on this option. In 1984, the Commis-
79. See Council Regulation 17/62, art. 4(1) 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 204.
80. Italian Cast Glass, supra note 46, at 24. In the amended EC TREATY the
language of Article 85(3) is found in Article 81(3).
81. Id.
82. See Joliet, supra note 31, at 420-21; Immenga, supra note 74, at 323.
83. 12TH REPORT, supra note 4, at 43, para. 38. In the amended EC TREATY,
the language of Article 85 is found in Article 81.
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sion exempted a crisis cartel for the first time." The agree-
ment was between ten of the largest European synthetic fiber
producers to close 18% of their production capacity.85 As part
of its approval, the Commission required the participants to
take the following steps: (1) to supply to a trustee all relevant
information concerning the capacity to be dismantled and to
permit the inspection of their plants by independent experts,"
(2) to consult each other in the event of important changes on
the market," and (3) not to sell the dismantled plants."
Since 1984, the Commission has exempted only one other
crisis cartel.89 Because of the informal procedure which oc-
curs, it is difficult to determine how many proposed crisis car-
tels the Commission has refused to exempt.9" Once firms in-
volved in or contemplating a crisis cartel decide to approach
the Commission to receive clearance, the contact is made at an
informal level. In some cases, it is made via the Commissioner
responsible for industrial policy since he or she tends to be
more receptive than his or her colleagues to the argument that
the other means of addressing excess capacity are inappropri-
ate. Once the blessing of that Commissioner is received, the
firms (or even that Commissioner) approaches the Directorate
General for Competition (DGIV) informally prior to any formal
notification being submitted. If the DGIV responds negatively,
the plan is often dropped without ever filing a formal notifica-
tion. In other words, there is little in the way of public records
identifying the attempts to establish a crisis cartel. A formal
decision by the Commission is only rendered when it has been
determined in advance that the crisis cartel should be ap-
proved. Conversely, a formal decision may be reached where
the Commission discovers a purported crisis cartel which was
never notified to the Commission.
84. See Synthetic Fibres, supra note 14.
85. See 13TH REPORT, supra note 5, at 54, para. 59.
86. See Synthetic Fibres, supra note 14, at 20, art. 18(a)(f).
87. See id. at 20, art. 18(g).
88. See id. at 20, art. 18(a).
89. See Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15.
90. In one case, it prohibited a purported crisis cartel which had been ap-
proved under German competition law. See Case C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe GmbH
v. Commission, (E.C.J. Dec. 17, 1998) (not yet reported).
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2. Requirements for an Exemption
Agreements which infringe Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty
are automatically invalid unless they qualify for an exemption
under Article 81(3).91 Once the Commission made the policy
decision in 1984 to exempt a crisis cartel, it was faced with the
legal problem of explaining how the cartel met the require-
ments of an exemption under Article 81(3). There are two legal
constraints which make the Commission's task difficult. First,
the Commission is obligated by Community law to state the
reasons for its decisions. Failure to give a well-reasoned opin-
ion based on sound economic reasoning can lead to the nullity
of the decision.92 Second, the Court has stated that the Com-
mission must refuse to grant an exemption under Article 81(3)
unless all of the requirements are met.93 Thus, the Commis-
sion is faced with the difficult task of explaining how crisis car-
tels fulfill each of the requirements of an exemption under
Article 81(3). Its reasoning has been less than convincing.
a. Improvement in Production, Distribution, Technology or
Economic Progress
The first requirement under Article 81(3) is that the agree-
ment must contribute to improving the production or distribu-
tion of goods or promoting technical or economic progress. 4
The standard which the Commission itself has set forth is that
the improvement must entail objective and appreciable advan-
tages such as to compensate for any disadvantages caused by
the restraint.95 In the context of crisis cartels, the basic bene-
91. EC TREATY art. 81(1)(3).
92. See, e.g., Joined cases T-528, T-542 & T-546/93, Metropole Television v.
Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 11-649, 683, para. 93 (Ct. First Instance); Joined cases 96
to 102, 104, 105, 108 & 110/82, IAZ v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3369, 3414, para.
37.
93. See Metropole Television v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. at 11-683, para. 93;
Case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-595, 631, para. 104
(Ct. First Instance); Case T-66/89, Publishers Association v. Commission, 1992
E.C.R. 11-1995, 2011, para. 69 (Ct. First Instance); Joined Cases 43/82 & 63/82,
Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamse Boekwezen & Anor v. Commission,
1984 E.C.R. 19. See also Europe Asia Trades Agreement, 1999 O.J. (L 193) 23, at
48, para. 187.
94. EC TREATY art. 81(3).
95. See Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf/Federatie van Nederlandse
Kraanverhuur, 1994 O.J. (L 117) 30, at 35, para. 29.
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fit identified by the Commission is the restoration of an "eco-
nomically healthy structure of supply in the Community" in
that particular industry." The assumption is that the crisis
cartel will allow the industry to close its less efficient plants:
As the capacity closures concern production units that are the
least suitable and least efficient because of obsolescence,
limited size or outdated technology, production will in the
future be concentrated in the more modern plants which will
then be able to operate at higher capacity and productivity
levels; this will lead to a corresponding reduction in the inci-
dence of fixed costs, which form a large proportion of net
costsY
The Commission is well aware of the fact that a cartel
protects its members from market forces which would other-
wise eventually force them to reduce capacity. As a surrogate,
the Commission replaces the market mechanism with the
requirement of a plan to reduce capacity." This plan must
ensure that overcapacity is irreversibly dismantled and no new
capacity is created for the duration of the cartel.99
b. Benefits to Consumer
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty also requires the Commis-
sion to explain how the crisis cartel allows "consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit."' Explaining how this re-
quirement is fulfilled in the context of crisis cartels presents a
significant hurdle for the Commission since crisis cartels are
aimed at increasing the profitability of the incumbent firms
and, as the Commission recognizes, result in increased pric-
es. 1' Moreover, in other cases the Commission has indicated
that a cartel agreement which keeps inefficient firms afloat
does so to the detriment of the public interest.'
96. 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 49, para. 85.
97. Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, at 19, para. 26.
98. See id. at 20, para. 33; 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 48, para. 84.
99. See 12TH REPORT, supra note 4, at 43, para. 39; 23RD REPORT, supra note
3, at 49, para. 85.
100. EC TREATY art. 81(3).
101. See Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, at 20, para. 31; Synthetic Fibres,
supra note 14, at 23, para. 41.
102. See Fire Insurance, 1985 O.J. (L 35) 20, at 28, para. 44.
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The Commission's basic position in the context of applying
this requirement to crisis cartels is that a "healthy" European
industry is good for consumers."°3 The Commission overlooks
or even rejects the notion that the crisis cartel will lead to
higher prices for consumers.' The policy reasoning behind
the exemption for crisis cartels is that the reduction in capaci-
ty will lower the fixed costs for the incumbent firms and, as-
suIning prices remain stable, will generate profits for them.0 5
The problem is, however, that the increased profits are eco-
nomic rent which is paid for by the consumers without any
redeeming welfare benefits. In a competitive industry the bene-
fits accruing from a lowering of fixed costs are typically passed
on to the consumer in the form of lower prices. Increased prof-
its for the producers resulting from the crisis cartel means that
the prices for consumers are higher than they would be in the
absence of the cartel.
Assuming, however, that a profitable European industry is
indeed a benefit to consumers, there is no guarantee that the
ensuing benefits will incur to the benefit of the consumer
which is required by Article 81(3). In exemption decisions, the
Commission, after identifying a certain benefit, typically relies
on the fact that existing competition within the industry in
which the agreement takes place will force the parties to the
agreement to pass on the benefits to the consumers.0 6 In the
case of crisis cartels, however, most if not all of the industry
needs to be part of the cartel in order for it to have any chance
of success. Otherwise, those firms not involved in the cartel
would be able to increase their capacity utilization rates, lower
their marginal costs and place the cartel members at a severe
competitive disadvantage. 7 In fact, since the crisis cartel re-
sults in inflated prices, there is an incentive to increase capaci-
ty. This is why the Commission requires that the cartel include
those firms representing all or a significant percentage of ca-
pacity in the relevant sector.' ° However, if a majority of the
103. See Synthetic Fibres, supra note 14, at 22, para. 30.
104. See Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, at 20, para. 31.
105. See Synthetic Fibres, supra note 14, at 22, para. 34.
106. See Ford/Volkswagen, 1993 O.J. (L 20) 14, 17, para. 27; Schdller
Lebensmittel GrobH, 1993 O.J. (L 183) 1, 14, para. 1.22 (1993); Rockwell/lveco,
1983 O.J. (L 224) 19, 25.
107. See RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIc PERSPECTIVE 53
(1976); D.K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AAIi. ECON. REV. 835 (1976).
108. See 13TH REPORT, supra note 5, at 53, para. 56; 23RD REPORT, supra note
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competitors are involved in a cartel, it is questionable whether
there will be sufficient competition to force the cartel members
to pass on the benefits. The protection from competitive forces
which is required for the success of the cartel suggests that the
cartel members would not be forced to pass on any benefits to
the consumers.
c. Indispensability of Restrictions
The third requirement which must be fulfilled before the
Commission grants an exemption is that the restrictions im-
posed by the agreement must be indispensable to attaining the
redeeming consumer benefits." 9 The first issue in applying
this indispensability test is whether there are other less re-
strictive means to obtain the identified benefit."0 If other
means of obtaining the objective exist which are less restrictive
of competition, an exemption cannot be granted."' In the
context of crisis cartels this standard poses a significant hurdle
for the Commission because the Commission must state why
there are no other means of reducing capacity which are less
restrictive of competition. As discussed above, cartels are only
one method of addressing the problem of structural excess
capacity.
Two alternative methods which might be less restrictive of
competition are market forces and state intervention. In most
instances, market forces are a much more appropriate response
(at least from the perspective of consumer welfare) to the eco-
nomic situation which crisis cartels are ostensibly designed to
address. The justification for crisis cartels is the elimination of
excess capacity. Generally, excess capacity can only exist in a
competitive market for a short period of time. If costs associat-
ed with excess capacity are causing the production of the par-
ticular product to be unprofitable, the industry will generally
3, at 49, para. 84.
109. See EC TREATY art. 81(3)(a).
110. See, e.g., Matra Hachette v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-595, at 11-643,
para. 138.
111. See id. at "II-636, para. 122; Exxon/Shell, 1994 O.J. (L 144) 20, at 32,
para. 73; Grundig, 1994 O.J. (L 20) 15, para. 38; Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236)
30, paras. 62-63; Kabel-metal-Luchaire, 1975 O.J. (L 222) 34, 39; Bayer/Gist-Bro-
cades, 1976 O.J. (L 30) 13, 20; NCH, 1972 O.J. (L 22) 26; De Laval/Stork, 1977
O.J. (L 215) 11, 18; Screensport/EBU Members, 1991 O.J. (L 63) 32, 44.
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reduce excess capacity on its own."' Although the Commis-
sion recognizes this attribute of a market economy,1 it re-
jects the assumption that the market is an equally efficient
means of obtaining the same results as a crisis cartel."' In
its Stichting Baksteen decision, for example, the Commission
stated that in the absence of the crisis cartel, "[tihe other par-
ties, as leading manufacturers, would not have decided individ-
ually and independently to reduce capacity had they not been
certain that competitors would follow their example.""5
The Commission has identified two types of subsidies
which suggest that the market may not be as efficient as a
crisis cartel at restoring market equilibrium. First, cross-subsi-
dization may allow less efficient firms to remain in the market
rather than being forced out by their more efficient competi-
tors."6 The Commission has identified two sources of cross-
subsidies which could produce this effect."' According to the
Commission, "[u]ndertakings which have failed to make the
necessary adjustments may have their losses offset within
their groups, to the detriment of healthy undertakings.""'
This reasoning rests on the assumption that the profit to be
made in the long term exceeds the losses which the group will
be forced to absorb in the short term. No reasonable entrepre-
neur would cross-subsidize a losing affiliate unless there was
profit to eventually be made. The assumption upon which the
Commission's policy is based, i.e. that there are profits to be
made in the particular industry in the long term, exposes the
contradiction in the Commission's reasoning. In such an indus-
112. The recent experience of the semiconductor industry provides a prominent
example of how market forces operate to achieve equilibrium when faced with
excess capacity. See Michiyo Nakamoto, Hitachi Closes Chip Factory, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1997, at 23; Takahashi & Hardy, supra note 34, at B8; Takahashi, supra
note 34, at B7; Deveney, supra note 34, at A12.
113. In its 12th Report, the Commission recognized that "[i]n a predominantly
free market economy such as the Community's, it is up to each undertaking to
assess for itself whether and at which point such overcapacity becomes economical-
ly unsustainable and to take the necessary measures to reduce it." 12TH REPORT,
supra note 4, at 43, para. 38.
114. See Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, at 19, para. 24. See also COMMIS-
SION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 24TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcY 1995
111, para. 179 (1995).
115. Stichting Baksteen, supra note 15, at 19, para. 24.
116. See id. at 19, para. 26.
117. See id.
118. 12TH REPORT, supra note 4, at 21, para. 38.
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try, the incumbent firms which do not belong to a larger group
willing to subsidize it until profits can be made still have ac-
cess to the capital markets. If indeed profit is to be had, as the
Commission assumes, these independent firms should be able
to get access to the requisite capital. However, even if one
assumes that there are imperfections in the capital markets,
the Commission's reasoning ignores the fact that other firms or
groups with significant financial resources could purchase the
efficient plants once the independent firm was forced out of the
market. These other firms would be attracted by the same long
term returns which motivated the cross-subsidization." 9
The other type of subsidy which has been identified by the
Commission as the reason why market forces are less efficient
than a crisis cartel at reducing excess capacity is state subsi-
dies. According to the Commission, in certain industries, com-
petition often has been "distorted by state aid aimed at creat-
ing capacity."' Inefficient undertakings have been able to
remain in the market because Member States have extended
them aid. This prevents or at least delays the restoration of a
market equilibrium.
While this may be an accurate assessment of the situation
in many Member States, it does not explain why the formation
of a crisis cartel is indispensable to reducing capacity as re-
quired by Article 81(3). In fact, the more appropriate method of
addressing industries plagued by excess capacity caused by
state aid is to increase enforcement of Article 87 and Article 88
of the EC Treaty. These provisions provide that any aid grant-
ed to a Member State in any form which distorts or threatens
to distort competition by favoring certain industries or the
production of certain goods shall be incompatible with the
Common Market.'2 ' Member States are required to seek the
Commission's approval for new aid granted and the Commis-
sion has the authority to recover any aid granted illegally.'22
119. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 214 (2d ed. 1980). This scenario was played out recently in the steel
industry. See Larry Holyoke, et al., Psst! Wanna Buy a Used Steel Plant?, BUS.
WK., Aug. 22, 1994, at 48; Stephen Baker & Keith L. Alexander, Niche Work-If
You Can Get It, BUS. WK., Aug. 29, 1994, at 31.
120. 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 47, para. 82.
121. EC TREATY arts. 87, 88.
122. See generally Hans-Jochim Priess, Recovery of Illegal State Aid: An Over-
view of Recent Developments in the Case Law, 33 COMION MKT. L. REV. 69
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Stricter enforcement of the rules on state aid is less restrictive
of competition than crisis cartels.
C. Absence of Possibility of Foreclosure
The fourth requirement for an exemption under Article
81(3) is that the agreement must not "afford such undertakings
the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a sub-
stantial part of the products in question.""3 This requirement
presents a problem for the Commission because on the one
hand the Commission, in applying this requirement, generally
relies on the collective market position of the parties to the
agreement to determine whether substantial competition will
be foreclosed.'24 On the other hand, in the context of crisis
cartels, the requirement under Article 81(3) that the benefits
be passed on to the consumers'" means that, according to
the Commission's policy, at least a majority of members of the
industry participate in the cartel.'26 From a practical perspec-
tive, in fact, this is generally the only way the cartel can
achieve its objective of capacity reduction. This places the
Commission in a difficult position in applying Article 81(3)
since it must explain why the cartel does not preclude substan-
tial competition. In the Stichting Baksteen case, 16 of the 25
Dutch firms on the Dutch brick market participated in the
cartel. These participants represented 90% of installed capacity
in the Netherlands accounting for 85% of total brick sales."'
In the Synthetic Fibres case, the members of the crisis cartel
held about 70% of total synthetic fiber capacity and about 85%
of installed capacity in the Community.2 '
The Commission is aware of this inconsistency but argues
that since the reduction of capacity is only one element of the
competitive strategy of the firms, they will not have surren-
dered all the freedom of action in the marketplace with the
(1996).
123. EC TREATY art. 81(3)(b).
124. See, e.g., Europe Asia Trades Agreement, 1999 O.J. (L 193) 23, 55, para.
232; Banque Nationale de Paris/Dresdner Bank, 1996 O.J. (L 188) 37, 46; Welded
Steel Mesh, 1989 O.J. (L 260) 1, 70 para. 187.
125. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
126. See 13TH REPORT, supra note 5, at 53, para. 56; 23RD REPORT, supra note
3, at 48, para. 84.
127. Stichting Baksteen, -supra note 15, at 16, para. 5.
128. Synthetic Fibres, supra note 14, at 18, para. 7.
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result that a degree of "internal" competition will be main-
tained."9 The Commission also points out that the presence
of other firms in the market which are not parties to the car-
tel, as well as imports from third countries, will usually pro-
vide a source of external competition. 3 ' It is difficult to con-
jecture where the Commission is going with this line of reason-
ing. If there is sufficient competition remaining in the indus-
try, the success of the crisis cartel at reducing capacity will be
jeopardized. It makes no difference whether this competition is
"internal" or "external." In addition, the fact that the firms
continue to be competitors does not mitigate the negative im-
pact that the cartel will have on competition and consumer
welfare. Needless to say, the Commission's line of reasoning in
this context has never been scrutinized by the European
Courts.
D. Crisis Cartels and the Application of Article 82
Up to this point, the focus of this article has been on the
compatibility of crisis cartels with Article 81 of the EC Treaty
and, in particular, the requirements for an exemption under
Article 81(3). However, Article 81 constitutes only one part of
the European competition-law regime. Another important pro-
vision is Article 82 of the EC Treaty which prohibits the abuse
of a dominant position. In contrast to Article 81, however,
Article 82 does not provide for the possibility of an exemp-
tion. '3 Thus, the Commission is required to prohibit all abus-
es of a market dominating position which have an effect on
trade within the European Community.
This raises several issues in the context of crisis cartels.
The first issue is whether the application of Article 82 to crisis
cartels is precluded where the Commission has granted an
exemption under Article 81(3). Both the Commission and the
European Courts have repeatedly stated that Article 81 and
129. See 12TH REPORT, supra note 4, at 44, para. 39.
130. See Synthetic Fibres, supra note 14, at 24, para. 50; 12TH REPORT, supra
note 4, at 44, para. 39.
131. See Joined cases T-24, 25, 26 & 28/93, Compagnie Maritime Belge Trans-
ports v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 11-1201, 1254, para. 152 (Ct. First Instance);
Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bektinpfung Unlauteren
Wettbewerbs, 1989 E.C.R. 838, 848, para. 32; Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing v.
Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 11-309, 358, para. 25 (Ct. First Instance).
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Article 82 apply to two different types of restraints of competi-
tion.'32 Thus, the fact that a particular practice fulfills the re-
quirements of an exemption under Article 81(3) does not pre-
clude the application of Article 86 to that same practice if all
the elements of an infringement of Article 82 are fulfilled.
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The second issue therefore is whether crisis cartels in-
fringe Article 82 of the EC Treaty. There are essentially three
elements to an infringement of Article 82: (1) market domi-
nance, (2) abuse of that dominance, and (3) effect on trade
between Member States. Since crisis cartels generally involve
undertakings from several Member States, the third element
would not be an issue." In European competition law, a
dominant position is generally understood as "the ability to act
to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, custom-
ers and ultimately of the consumers." 3 ' A market share of at
least 50% will generally be indicative of dominance.'36 A mar-
ket share below 10% usually is sufficient to illustrate that the
undertaking is not in a dominant position."7
There is nothing inherent about crisis cartels which would
suggest that any of the firms involved has a dominant position.
To the contrary, the fact that the firms agreed to form a crisis
cartel suggests that none of them has a dominant position.
However, Article 82 also applies to situations where two or
more firms hold a position of collective dominance. 3 ' The ex-
istence of "economic links" between the firms is sufficient for
their individual market positions to be considered together."9
132. See Case T-51189, Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 11-309,
356, (Ct. First Instance); Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Com-
mission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 244, para. 25.
133. See Case T-51/89 Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement, 1999 O.J. (L 95) 1,
94, para. 550; Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 11-309, 358, para. 24
(Ct. First Instance).
134. The requirement that there is an effect on trade between Member States
is the same as under Article 85 of the EC Treaty. See Joined cases 6 & 7/73,
Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 252, para. 30.
135. Case 85/76, Hoffinann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 541;
Case 30/87, Bodson v. Pompes Funibres, 1988 E.C.R. 2479, 2514; Case 247/86,
Socint6 alsacienne et lorraine de tdldcommunications et d'6lectronique v. Novasam,
1988 E.C.R. 5987, 6008-09.
136. See Case C-62/86, Akzo v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359, 3453.
137. See Case 75/84, Metro v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 3021, 3023.
138. Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement, supra note 133, at 90, para. 521.
139. See Joined cases T-68/89, 77/89 & 78/89, SIV v. Comm'n, 1992 E.C.R. II-
1403, 1548, para. 358 (Ct. First Instance); Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement,
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This requirement is fulfilled, for example, where the firms
have entered into an agreement or engaged in concerted prac-
tices in the sense of Article 81.1 Thus, a crisis cartel would
fulfill the first requirement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. As
discussed above, one of the basic requirements established by
the Commission is that the crisis cartel include most, if not all,
competitors in a particular market. Since a crisis cartel must
be based on an agreement, the members would together occupy
a position of collective dominance.
The mere existence of market dominance, however, is not
sufficient to establish an infringement of Article 82. There
must also be abuse of that dominance. A dominant firm abuses
its position when it engages in conduct that would not be pos-
sible in a competitive market." The mere fact that crisis
cartels infringe Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty is not evidence
per se that the conduct infringes Article 82. The abuse of the
collective dominant position within the context of a crisis cartel
exists when the members agree to limit production, thereby re-
ducing supply and increasing the price the consumer has to
pay for the product. Article 82(b) of the EC Treaty expressly
identifies, as an example of abuse, the limitation of production
to the detriment of customers.' When firms in a position of
collective dominance use their position to restrict output, there
is an infringement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In most
instances, therefore, a crisis cartel would amount to an in-
fringement of Article 82 even if it has been exempted under
Article 81(3).
supra note 133, at 90, para. 521. But see, Case T-102196, Gencor, Ltd. v. Comm'n,
(Ct. First Instance 1999), [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 971, 1065, para. 273 (suggesting that
even economic links are not required). See also Barry J. Rodger, Oligolpolistic
Market Failure: Collective Dominance Versus Complex Monopoly, 1 EUI. COMPETI-
TION L. REV. 21 (1995); David Flint, Abuse of a Collective Dominant Position, in
LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 21 (1978).
140. See Compagnie Maritime Belge v. Commission, supra note 131, at 11-1230,
paras. 60, 62; Case T-68/89, T-77/89, T-78/89, SIV v. Comm'n, 1992 E.C.R. 11-1403,
1548, para. 358 (Ct. First Instance); Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113
& 114/73, Suiker Unie v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 2011; Case C-393/92,
Municipality of Almelo v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1477, 1520, para.
42; European Sugar Industry, 1973 O.J. (L 140) 17, at 39; CEWAL, 1993 O.J. (L
34) 20, para. 49; French-West African shipowners' committee, 1992 O.J. (L 134) 1,
paras. 55-58; Rodby, 1994 O.J. (L 55) 52, para. 11; Trans-Atlantic Conference
Agreement, supra note 133, at 96, para. 521.
141. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 541.
142. EC TREATY art. 82(b).
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This contradictory result of the parallel application of
Aiticle 81 and Article 82 to crisis cartels is explained by the
fact that the Commission does not apply the elements of Arti-
cle 81(3) consistently to crisis cartels as to other forms of re-
strictive practices. Agreements between competitors represent-
ing a major portion of the market designed to restrict output
and raise prices do not technically fulfill the requirements of
Article 81(3). Thus, if the law were applied correctly, there
would be no conflict between the application of Article 81 and
82. The crisis cartel would be prohibited by both provisions.
For policy reasons, however, the Commission pragmatically
applies the rules to crisis cartels. This stretching of the exemp-
tion possibility under Article 81(3) to crisis cartels is the source
of the conflict with Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
VI. CRISIS CARTELS AND THE TRIUMPH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The authorization of crisis cartels under the European
competition laws represents another triumph of industrial
policy over competition law in Europe. This has negative conse-
quences for the European legal system and European consum-
ers. From a purely legal perspective, the creative application of
the competition rules to crisis cartels undermines the legitima-
cy of European competition law. Based on the Commission's
decisions in prior cases, it is difficult to argue that the forma-
tion of a cartel between most if not all the competitors in a
particular industry designed to reduce capacity would fulfill
the requirements set forth in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. In
any event, it would probably be caught by the prohibition of
Article 82 which does not allow for an exemption. The Commis-
sion gets around this by simply not applying Article 82 to crisis
cartels. The fundamental issue whether crisis cartels can be
exempted under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty or whether they
infringe Article 82 of the EC Treaty has not been addressed by
the European courts. Therefore, the reasoning the Commission
uses to exempt such cartels has never been subject to judicial
scrutiny. This is largely because those who suffer the injury
from crisis cartels, the consumers, do not have standing to
contest the decisions.143 The injury to the individual consum-
143. In order for a natural or legal person to contest a decision of the Commis-
sion, the decision must be addressed to him or of direct and individual concern to
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er is indirect and outweighed by the costs of contesting the
decision.' Although the competitors who are not involved in
the crisis cartel would arguably be able to contest the deci-
sion, 4 ' they would have no interest in doing so since the car-
tel results in higher prices from which they can benefit.
Crisis cartels are permitted by the competition rules not
because they comport with the competition provisions of the
EC Treaty, but rather as a matter of industrial policy. The
triumph of industrial policy over competition law is an illegiti-
mate exercise of the Commission's authority. The European
Court of Justice has specifically stated: "In no circumstances
does it [the Commission] have the authority to authorize prac-
tices which are contrary to the Treaty."46 Moreover, the tri-
umph of industrial policy over competition law creates incon-
sistencies in the application of European competition law. As
discussed above, since the Commission is required to issue a
formal decision exempting a crisis cartel under Article 81(3) of
the EC Treaty, it is forced to adopt reasoning which is ques-
tionable and sometimes contradictory. One way to avoid the
distortion would be to recognize that the authorization of crisis
cartels is a policy decision rather than a result of the objective
application of European competition law. In the United States,
for example, crisis cartels, when promoted by the state as a
matter of industrial policy, are permitted by application of the
state action doctrine rather than by creatively applying the
antitrust laws. 47
him. See EC TREATY art. 230. Persons other than those to whom a decision is
addressed may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reasons of cir-
cumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons nd by virtue
of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person
addressed. See Joined cases T-443/93, T-448/93 and T-449/93, Associazione Italiana
Tecnico Economica del Cemento v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 11-1971, 1988, para.
34 (Ct. First Instance); Case T-2/93, Air France v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-323,
340, para. 42 (Ct. First Instance).
144. In the most recent crisis cartel case, no one even bothered to respond to
the Commission's invitation for comments. See Stichting Baksteen, 1993 O.J. (C
34) 11.
145. See Metropole Television v. Commission, supra note 92, at 11-673-675,
paras. 59-65.
146. Union Royale Belge v. Bosman, supra note 72, at 1-5078, para. 136.
147. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
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More important than the legal distortions which the Euro-
pean Commission's approach to crisis cartels creates is the
social costs which the triumph of industrial policy imposes on
Europeans. The most direct social cost imposed by crisis cartels
is in the form of monopoly prices. The existence of the cartel
means that the prices for the products involved in the cartel
are higher than they would have been if the cartel did not
exist. This economic rent is collected by the incumbent firms
which may or may not use the rent to enhance efficiency.
In addition, there is an indirect social cost resulting from
the impact which crisis cartels have on the competitiveness of
the industry involved in the cartel. As the Commission has
expressly recognized, "the competitiveness of European indus-
try as a whole [is promoted] by strict enforcement of the com-
petition rules."14 As Schumpeter recognized, the defining
characteristic of competition is its ability to force firms to in-
crease efficiency or be forced from the market.' By protect-
ing firms from these forces, the authorization of crisis cartels
diminishes the incentives of firms to increase their efficiency.
If European industry were not exposed to global competition,
the impact of this protection would not be extreme. However,
since European firms are forced to compete on the global stage,
the permissive policy towards crisis cartels places European
industry at a distinct competitive disadvantage.
Although the European Commission cites the positive
effect on employment as one of the redeeming characteristics of
crisis cartels, 5 ' the harm to the competitiveness of European
industry may actually have a negative effect on employment.
In the short term, crisis cartels may artificially increase em-
ployment by delaying the exit of the inefficient firms. In the
long term, however, crisis cartels may have another negative
effect on employment. By shielding these firms from the com-
petitive forces that would otherwise require them to enhance
their efficiency, the Commission is simply postponing the inevi-
table. These firms, once exposed to global competition, will be
148. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 26TH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1996 18, para. 8 (1996).
149. JOSEPH A. SCHUrMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (7th
ed. 1994).
150. See 23RD REPORT, supra note 3, at 48, para. 85. Although the Commission
has also identified the "impact on employment" as a benefit of such agreements,
this benefit is only incidental since it is not identified in Article 81(3).
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at a distinct disadvantage. The absence of a competitive advan-
tage in a global industry could result in the long-term in high-
er unemployment. Take, for example, the case where the ex-
cess capacity of a firm is due to the fact that another competi-
tor has introduced a more efficient production technique or a
better product which it is able to offer at a lower price. In most
cases, this is the result of significant investment and hence
risk. Often, this development will force the "obsolete" product
or firm from the market and the increased demand for the
product of the more efficient firm will increase thereby necessi-
tating an increase in employment.
Finally, there is an element of unfairness in the
Commission's policy. For one, the departure from the strict
enforcement of competition law in the context of crisis cartels
has the effect of penalizing the firms which increase their
efficiency as a response to excess capacity. In addition, the
policy effectively penalizes those firms which correctly antici-
pated the development of demand and creates an incentive to
expand capacity. As discussed above, the time associated with
the expansion of capacity means that capacity is increased in
anticipation of demand. This is a risk because an inaccurate
assessment of future demand growth can create costly capaci-
ty. In a market economy, the market would punish the incor-
rect firms and reward the correct ones. If the market mecha-
nism is distorted by cartel agreements, the efficiencies of the
market are lost.
VII. CONCLUSION
The authorization of crisis cartels under European compe-
tition law is a policy decision rather than the result of the
objective application of the law. In fact, an objective applica-
tion of the law based on the Commission's position in other
cases would lead to the prohibition of crisis cartels. The same
conditions which require the success of the cartel in reducing
excess capacity indicate that crisis cartels do not fulfill the
requirements of an exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty. However, the triumph of policy over law requires the
creative application of European competition law. Moreover,
the basis of the policy are flawed. The creation of crisis cartels
imposes significant social costs on European society. The only
actors who benefit from the policy are the firms who collect the
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rent facilitated by the cartel. This suggests that the triumph of
industrial policy over competition law in the context of crisis
cartels is a manifestation of the success of private interests to
the detriment of the long-term competitiveness of European
industry and the European public.
